Florida Law Review
Volume 25

Issue 3

Article 9

March 1973

Government in the Sunshine: Another Cloud on the Horizon
Joseph S. Gillin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Joseph S. Gillin, Government in the Sunshine: Another Cloud on the Horizon, 25 Fla. L. Rev. 603 (1973).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss3/9

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Gillin: Government in the Sunshine: Another Cloud on the Horizon
1973]

CASE COMMENTS

GOVERNMENT IN TIlE SUNSHINE: ANOTHER CLOUD ON THE
HORIZON
Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972)
Professional labor negotiators, employed by the Dade County School Board
to negotiate tentative teacher contracts, met privately with representatives of
the Dade County Classroom Teachers' Association and privately with the
school board.' Bassett and other citizens of Dade County sought to enjoin
these private collective bargaining activities as violations of Florida's "government in the sunshine" law.2 The Circuit Court of Dade County held for
the school board. On direct appeals the Florida supreme court affirmed and
HELD, that private preliminary negotiations between representatives of the
school board and representatives of a teachers' association do not violate the
sunshine law and that the board may instruct and consult with its negotiators
without such violation. 4
The first legislative recognition of the public's right to know was a 1905
statute 5 requiring the opening of town and city council meetings. In 1967,
after several years of consideration,6 the Florida Legislature significantly
enhanced this right by enacting the broadly worded "government in the
sunshine" law, 7 requiring all meetings of any state, county, or municipal
board or commission to be open to the public. The provision was aimed at
reviving the public's confidence in the integrity of governmental process. 8
Similar statutes enacted in other jurisdictions typically contain explicit
exceptions 9 to the open meeting requirement. Common exceptions include
1. 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972).
2. FLA. STAT. §286.011 (1) (1971) provides in part: "All meetings of any board or
commission of any state agency or authority . .. except as otherwise provided in the constitution, at which official acts are to be taken are declared to be public meetings open
to the public at all times, and no . . . formal action shall be considered binding except
as taken or made at such meeting."
3. FLA. CONsr. art. V, §4(2) provides for direct appeal to the supreme court where
the circuit court has construed a constitutional provision.
4. 262 So. 2d at 426. Dekle, J., provided a majority opinion, joined by Carlton & McCain,
JJ., and Drew, J. (retired). Roberts, C.J., concurred specially while Adkins, J., dissented,
joined by Boyd, J.
5. FLA. STAT. §165.22 (1971). This statute requires meetings of city or town councils
to be open to the public but was construed as applying only to "formal assemblages" required by law. Turk v. Richard, 47 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1950).
6. Two similar bills introduced in April 1961 would have prohibited public boards of
state, county, district, or municipal governments from holding closed meetings. FLA. S.
JoUr. 103 (April 12, 1961); FLA. S. JOUR. 125 (April 13, 1961).
7. FLA. STAT. §286.011 (1971).
8. For a general discussion of the scope of the sunshine law, see Note, Government in
the Sunshine: Promise or Placebo?, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 361 (1971).
9.

See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §12-2805 (1968) (excepts personnel matters); CAL. Gov'T
§54,957 (West 1966) (excepts personnel matters, grand juries, matters affecting national security and examination of witnesses); IND. ANN. STAT. §57-605 (1961) (excepts confidential records); NJ. STAT. ANN. §10:4-4 (Supp. 1972) (excepts confidential records and
eminent domain proceedings); N.M. STAT. ANN. §5-6-17 (1953) (excepts grand juries).
CODE
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personnel matters, 10 grand juries,"' and confidential records. 1 2 Florida's law
provided no exceptions. For example, the senate rejected a proposed house of
representatives amendment excepting hearings involving individuals charged
with violation of law or regulations regarding employment. 13 Since specific
exceptions were rejected by the senate, it can only be presumed that, aside
from constitutional limitations expressed in the statute, 4 a broad application
of the sunshine requirements was intended. 5
This legislative intention has been effectuated through the broad interpretation given the law by the Florida courts. 16 For instance, in Times Publishing Co. v. Williams'7 the Second District Court of Appeal delineated the
breadth of the sunshine requirement. In granting the petitioner's plea to
enjoin the Pinellas County School Board from holding secret "informal"
meetings to discuss school personnel matters and to consult with the board's
attorney, the court held the statute applicable to every board or commission
gathering at which any official action was to be taken or considered.' 8 Rejecting the respondent's argument that personnel matters and consultation with
its attorney were beyond the statute's scope the court stated that, with one
narrow exception,' 9 it is the "entire decision-making process that the legisla20
The
ture intended to affect by the enactment of the statute before us."

court found that each step of the decision-making process constitutes an
"official act" within the meaning of the statute,2 since it is how and why the
22
officials decide to act that primarily interests the public.

Having defined the scope of the sunshine law the supreme court was next
asked to determine what constituted a meeting. In Board of Public Instruc-

10. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §12-2805 (1968); CAL. GOV'T CODE §54,957 (West 1966).
11. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §54,957 (West 1966); N.M. STAT. ANN. §5-6-17 (1953).
12. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §57-605 (1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. §10:4-4 (Supp. 1972).
13. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 958-59 (June 5, 1967); FLA. S. JOUR. 679 (June 6, 1967).
14. FLA. STAT. §286.011 (1) (1971) provides in part: "All meetings of any board
except as otherwise provided in the constitution . . . are declared to be public meetings."
(Emphasis added.)
15. One commentator has identified three flaws in the present statute: It does not
state which bodies are not affected by the law, it fails to exclude any types of deliberation
from its scope, and it does not recognize any state in the deliberative process that might be
exempt from the open meeting requirement. Note, supra note 8, at 364.
16. See City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971); Board of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969); Canney v. Board of Pub. Instruction 231
So. 2d 84 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1971); Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1969); OPs. ATr'Y GEN. FLA. 071-32 (1971).
17. 222 So. 2d 470 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
18. Id. at 474.
19. The exception was limited to that area of the attorney-client relationship in which
the ethical obligations of the attorney conflict with the provisions of the statute. Id. at 476.
20. Id. at 473.

21.

Id.

22.

Id. at 474.
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tion of Broward County v. Doran23 appellant school board had met privately
to discuss certain items of public business24 but took formal action on these
matters only during meetings. The court construed the meaning of "public
meetings" 25 to include "any gathering of the members where the members
deal with some matter on which foreseeable action will be taken by the
board." 26 Thus, a meeting, whether formal or informal, was deemed to have
taken place within the meaning of the statute if future action might have
foreseeably been taken on matters under discussion.
The broad scope accorded the sunshine law in Williams and the foreseeable
action criterion for determining the existence of a meeting established in
Doran were both firmly supported by the supreme court in City of Miami
Beach v. Berns.27 In affirming the lower court decision granting an injunction
prohibiting the city council from meeting in private to discuss personnel
matters and eminent domain proceedings, the court found that where public
officials meet privately, either formally or informally, to transact public busi28
ness they violate the government in the sunshine law.
An important exception to the reach of the government in the sunshine
law was carved out by the First District Court of Appeal in Canney v.
Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County.29 Petitioner Canney sought
review of his suspension from school by the county school board for failure
to comply with a hair styling regulation, contending that the board violated
the sunshine law by deliberating privately on the proper sanction.30 In
upholding the dismissal, the court found that once the legislature has delegated quasi-judicial responsibilities to an agency, its prerogatives in the
matter have terminated.31 Thus, quasi-judicial proceedings fall outside the
2
scope of the sunshine law.3
In the instant case the court relied on the constitutional exception provided in the statute33 to reach its result. The Florida constitution expressly

23. 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969). The sunshine law also withstood constitutional scrutiny
under the void for vagueness doctrine as the court found the language of the statute
sufficiently definite to satisfy due process requirements. Id. at 698.
24. Id. at 695.
25. Id. at 698.
26. Id.
27. 245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971).
28. Id. at 41. The court also held that FLA. STAT. §286.011 (1971) supersedes and
repeals FLA. STAT. §165.22 (1971) (providing for open meetings of city and town councils).
Id. at 40.
29. 231 So. 2d 34 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
30. Id. at 39.
31. Id.
32. The attorney general of Florida has interpreted FLA. STAT. §286.011 (1971) as not
applicable to the judicial branch of government in Florida nor to legislative bodies performing quasi-judicial functions. Ors. ATr'y GEN. FLA. 071-32 (1971).
33. FLA. STAT. §286.011 (1) (1971) provides in part: "All meetings of any board
except as otherwise provided in the constitution ... are declared to be public meetings ..
(Emphasis added.)
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grants employees the right to bargain collectively. 34 Relying on uncontroverted testimony of national authorities on collective bargaining that full
publicity at each step of the negotiations would destroy effective collective
bargaining, 35 the court concluded that the constitutional right of the public's
representatives to bargain collectively would be unduly impaired by total
exposure.3 6
Additionally, the court recognized that the tentative agreements were not
binding on the school board and that the negotiator's recommendations had
received full consideration in a public meeting.37 The pragmatic aspect of
applying the open meeting requirement to these preliminary negotiations
was also considered. Noting that most of the work product of the executive
process is generated beyond the veil of "actual meetings,"38 the court found
that an imposition of the sunshine requirement on this level of deliberation
would impair efficient governmental operation: "To carry matters to such an
extreme approaches the ridiculous; it would defeat any meaningful and productive process of government."3 9
While deciding on constitutional grounds that the school board's labor
negotiators could lawfully meet in private with representatives of the teachers'
association, the court also found it significant that no meeting of the school
board was involved. The foreseeable action test 40 established in Doran to
determine the existence of a meeting implicitly involves a gathering of
some of the members of the public agency involved. Yet, the board did not
meet privately with the teachers' representatives and no "meeting by proxy"
occurred, since the board's negotiators had no authority to bind the board.
In deciding whether private meetings of the school board with its negotiators for purposes of instruction and consultation violated the sunshine law,
tile court again relied upon the constitutionally established right of employees
to bargain collectively. 41 Since the teachers' representatives would not be
reciprocally required to disclose acceptable limits of settlement, the court
concluded that the school board's position would be severely compromised
42
by complete candor.

34. FLA. CONsr. art. I, §6 provides: "The right of persons to work shall not be denied
or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor
organization. The right of employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain
collectively shall not be denied or abridged. Public employees shall not have the right to
strike."
35. 262 So. 2d at 426.
36. Id. at 427.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 428.
40. The court defined "meeting" to include any gathering of the members where the
members deal with some matter on which foreseeable action will be taken by the board.
Board of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693, 698 (Fla. 1969).
41. 262 So. 2d at 428.
42. Id.
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While the court appears to base its decision primarily on constitutional
grounds, most of the court's reasoning is devoted to policy arguments of
pragmatism and fairness. Although the constitutional provision protecting
the right to bargain collectively applies to employees, the court glossed over
any explanation of how the public's representatives (school board's labor
3
negotiators) qualify as employees.4
On the other hand, the dissent argued that the constitutional prohibition
of strikes by public employees"4 would negate any bargaining advantage
gained by the teachers' association through detailed knowledge of the board's
bargaining strategy.4 5 Unpersuaded, the majority concluded that the public's
interest in obtaining the best bargain for the public schools outweighed the
benefit to the public derived from opening meetings of the board and its
negotiators.46 Since such strategy meetings foreseeably could result in formal

action by the school board, the position taken by the court retreats from the
7
unqualified foreseeable action test established in Doran.4
The instant case signals a retreat from the broad construction previously
established. While recognizing that the primary purpose of the sunshine law
is to maintain the public's faith in governmental agencies through open
meetings,- s the instant decision precludes unnecessary interference with

efficient governmental operation by limiting the foreseeable action test, espe43. It appears that the constitution contemplates the right of employees to collectively
bargain for their own remuneration and working conditions as distinguished from the
right to collectively bargain as a vocation (labor negotiators). However, a special attorney
to a city council, whose duties were to advise and counsel with the city council, was
found to be an "employee." Pace v. King, 38 So. 2d 823, 826 (Fla. 1959).
44. FLA. CONST. art. I, §6 provides in part: "Public employees shall not have the right
to strike."
45. 262 So. 2d at 430.
46. Id. at 428.
47. A subsidiary issue dealt with summarily by the court involved the election of the
chairman and vice chairman of the school board by secret written ballot. The result was
unanimously affirmed by election in open meeting, but the outcome of the secret vote
was never made public. While the court held that any initial violation of the sunshine
requirement was cured by the subsequent public vote, this result appears aberrational
in light of Doran and should not be expected to recur in future cases. Id. at 428-29. Substantially similar activities by a school board had been enjoined by the court in Doran,
where the board had employed the device of identifying items to be voted on only by a
code number and letter. 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969). In the instant case the court's failure
to require the school board to reveal the results of the straw ballot and to record such
results in the minutes of the meeting seems unsupported, since the public had an interest
in how each board member voted in selecting the new officers. FLA. STAT. §286.011 (2)
(1971) provides in part: "The minutes of a meeting of any such board or commission of
any such state agency or authority shall be properly recorded and such records shall be
open to public inspection."
48. The court stated: "During past years tendencies toward secrecy in public affairs
have been the subject of extensive criticism. Terms such as managed news, secret meetings,
closed records, executive sessions, and study sessions have become synonymous with 'hanky
panky' in the minds of public-spirited citizens. One purpose of the Sunshine Law was to
maintain the faith of the public in governmental agencies:' Board of Pub. Instruction v.
Doran, 224 So. 2d 693, 699 (Fla. 1969).
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